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Abstract—The on-going RSSB/EPSRC UK SafeCap project 
develops modelling techniques and tools for improving railway 
capacity while ensuring that safety standards are maintained. 
This paper reports recent SafeCap results on designing a 
Domain Specific Language (DSL), a verification infrastructure 
and the approaches to estimating and improving capacity. 
 
Keywords—signalling safety, railway capacity, formal 
modelling, railway junction. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
nsuring and demonstrating railway system dependability    
 is crucial for the way our society operates. Formal 
methods have been successfully used in developing various 
railway control systems. The best-known examples include 
the use of the B Method [6] for designing various metro and 
suburban lines, and airport shuttles all over the world [9,2]. 
The formal methods here are used to trace the requirements 
to system models and to ensure and demonstrate the system 
safety.  Our work builds on this work. 
Our aim is to develop methods and tools that allow 
railway engineers to improve the node and junction capacity 
while guaranteeing operational safety. By capacity we 
understanding the capability of a given railway layout and 
associated signalling rules to provide a certain quality of 
services determined by specific traffic patterns.  
To achieve capacity improvement we offer engineers to 
model various changes of the layouts and signalling rules in 
the vicinity of the junctions or stations and evaluate the 
effect of the changes on the overall capacity. The safety of 
the original and modified models are checked by automated 
tools via a translation of railway topology and signalling 
rules into formal verification conditions.  
A common domain language for the description of 
railway schemes and signalling rules was necessitated by the 
desire to apply and compare the differing modelling 
techniques used in the project to a common set of problems 
as defined by the industrial partner of the project, Invensys. 
The domain language is meant to satisfy the requirements of 
a railway engineer, who prefers to see a detailed layout 
presented in a way as close as possible to the established 
practice, and a researcher, who needs to work with a 
relatively small and precisely defined set of concepts. It is, 
perhaps, impossible to completely meet such conflicting 
requirements in a single language but we see it as one of the 
project goals to make a solid effort in this direction.  
 An effort at an improvement requires changing railway 
topology and signalling rules. Any such change must be 
analysed from the position of operational safety: absence of 
                                                            
  This work is sponsored by RSSB and EPSRC UK. 
collisions and derailments. A complex project may require 
hundreds or thousands of changes (such large figures are 
achievable with mechanised transformation patterns) 
making an efficient and scalable tool support paramount. 
The aim of automated verification predicates a certain 
degree of formality in the definition of language concepts. 
 The techniques described in the paper form the 
foundation of an open modelling environment called the 
SafeCap Platform [4]. The environment offers a intuitive 
modelling interface that may be used by a railway engineer, 
not trained in any manner in the use of such tools, to enter 
and update railways schemas, access, 'by a press of a 
button', a range of verification tools and try finds ways to 
improve junction capacity.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the SafeCap domain specific language. The 
SafeCap approach to verification of safety properties is 
explained in Section III. Sections IV and V discuss capacity 
criteria and ways to improve junction capacity. Finally, 
Section IV briefly introduces a tooling platform supporting 
the SafeCap method.  
II.  DOMAIN SPECIFIC LANGUAGE 
 In SafeCap we study in isolation complex stations and 
junctions of a railway network. The focus is on the analysis 
and improvement of the throughput of a given layout in the 
context of service pattern defined by the wider context of 
the railway network. In geographical terms, a layout could 
span over an area of several miles. 
 SafeCap offers a fairly compact core DSL. This is due to 
the limited scope of our study - railway junctions rather than 
complete networks - and also the desire to have an open-
ended language where differing secondary elements may be 
defined for specific problem classes. The domain language 
defines the foundational concepts for the modelling of 
railway capacity. It attempts to capture, at a suitable level of 
abstraction, track topology, route and path definitions and 
signalling rules. By design, the language is extensible: one 
can dynamically define further attributes for all the 
predefined language elements and these are automatically 
picked up by the SafeCap Platform editor at no extra 
implementation effort.  
The basic element of a SafeCap schema is the definition 
of railway topology.  
A track is a piece of physical railway track; it is 
characterised by length, measured in meters and a height 
map - a detailed profile of track gradient used for capacity 
assessment. Track is not directed - a train may travel over 
track in either direction.  
A node is a fictitious device gluing tracks into a 
continuous layout. Each track is associated with two nodes 
which it connects.   
E
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Nodes and tracks of a schema define an undirected graph 
known as the topology graph of a schema. Such a graph 
must not contain self-loops (tracks that start and end on the 
same node) and must satisfy certain restriction on the 
number of tracks connected to any given node (i.e., the 
degree of a node). A valid topology contains nodes of 
degrees 1 to 4. There can be no isolated nodes (degree 0) 
and nodes with degree higher than 41. The following are the 
valid node types: a boundary node (degree 1) that marks the 
boundary between the considered layout and the rest of a 
railway network; a normal node (degree 2) used to connect 
two pieces of track; a point node (degree 3) and a diamond 
crossing (degree 4).  
 On the diagram in Fig. 22, node positions are identified by 
letters; boundary nodes are highlighted by pale green (or 
grey) squares. Boundary nodes may be further qualified into 
sink (minus sign) and source (plus sign) nodes to define 
nodes where trains only appear or disappear. On the diagram 
in the figure, the number under a track defines the track 
length in meters  
 To have several trains travelling over the same physical 
topology it is required to have an additional layer of 
structuring. This layer assists in the formulation of train 
movement principles that ensure safety. The following are 
the logical structuring concepts of a schema. 
 A point is a machine that moves loose ends of rails to 
alter the path of a train. In logical terms, a point identifies a 
sub-graph of the overall layout available at any given 
moment.  
 An ambit3 is a connected sub-graph of the topology graph 
equipped with a train detection circuit. An ambit is able 
report whether there is a train anywhere on ambit tracks but 
not the number of trains, if there is more than one, exact 
positions or the occupation status of individual tracks. We 
do not consider the possibility of detection circuit failure.  
 There are two important cases of ambits - those that 
include points and those that do not. The latter are called 
sections and are made of linear track and diamond crossings. 
The former are known as junctions and, in addition to linear 
tracks and diamond crossings, contain at least one point. 
From the modelling viewpoint, sections are static entities - 
they do not change their configuration over time.  
 A route is a continuous connection between two nodes of 
a layout. In route-based signalling, a route is also the unit of 
track reservation - a process that ensures the availability of 
some free track in front of a train. Formally, a route is a path 
sub-graph of a topology graph. Overlapping routes (sharing 
one or more ambits) are permitted. 
 A line is a sequence of routes; such a sequence must form 
a path through a layout starting and ending on boundary 
nodes.  
 A rule is a logical condition attached to a route or a point 
of a schema. The formation of a rule may follow the 
traditional approach of specifying clear and occupied 
ambits, point states, signals aspects and etc. In SafeCap, we 
also offer the option of writing a rule as an arbitrary first-
                                                            
1 We do not, at this time, consider non-standard points and crossings. 
2 This diagram is generated by the SafeCap Platform. 
3 We have opted for a new way to refer to a train detection circuit to avoid 
confusion with inconsistently used existing terminology. 
order logic formulae expressed over schema elements. 
 Note that we do not discuss signals - we regard them as 
optional track-side equipment indicating route states. We 
use, however, signal pictograms to denote route boundaries 
on a schema diagram. This is merely a notational 
convenience. 
 The diagram in Fig. 1 illustrates the relationship between 
the major concepts of the SafeCap DSL. 
Fig. 1.  Major concepts of the SafeCap DSL. 
 
 On the diagram the arrows signify: containment 
(diamond), inheritance (triangle) and aggregation 
(arrowhead). Circled are elements of physical topology. 
Rules may be defined in a traditional tabular form or as 
logical constraints in a notation specific to the verification 
back-end.  
 The SafeCap DSL is a formal language: a schema is 
interpreted as a hybrid transition model - a model mixing 
continuous and discrete behaviours. The discrete part is 
employed to derive static verification conditions (that is, 
theorems) and, as a supplementary technique, serve in the 
discovery of transition traces leading to the violation of 
safety conditions. The continuous part refines the discrete 
part with the notions of train acceleration/deceleration, point 
switching, driver reaction times and so on. 
 Static verification conditions take the form of logical 
constraints over the elements of a schema. They express 
requirements to schema topology, formation of routes, 
placement of speed limits (a square box with a number in 
Fig. 2 diagram), and signalling rules of routes and points. If 
all such conditions are discharged, it is guaranteed, for all 
possible rail traffic that the schema is free from potential 
collisions and derailments.  
There are 32 such conditions and cumulatively they form 
the theory of the SafeCap schemas. A schema is valid if it is 
proven to be a model in this theory. 
III. SAFETY VERIFICATION 
We briefly discuss how the two central safety conditions 
of railways are addressed in the SafeCap DSL.  
A schema must be free from collisions. A collision 
happens when two trains occupy the same part of a track. In 
terms of our DSL, we can only speak about potential 
collisions due to simultaneous occupation of the same ambit 
by two trains. 
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One cannot show the absence of collisions without 
explaining how a train moves around a railway layout, i.e., 
the driving rules. If a train (its driver and on-board 
equipment) ignore route state indication there is really 
nothing to prevent train collisions. Hence, the absence of 
collisions is not a property of a schema per se but that of a 
combination of a schema and train driving rules (which may 
including assistant technologies such as TPWS and ATP). 
Of course, it is essential to establish that a schema is safe 
under some sensible driving rules. We have validated the 
DSL semantics through an encoding of an ATP-assisted 
driving in Event-B model and proving that DSL topology 
and signalling constraints imply the absence of collisions.  
A schema must be free from derailments. A derailment 
may happen when a train moves over a point changing its 
configuration. There is an explicit rule attached to each 
point requiring that a point may be moved only when all the 
routes containing the point are not occupied. The condition 
is sufficient to ensure that none of track points are occupied 
when a point moves, provided that trains are driven in 
compliance with route states. 
The primary mechanism for verifying schema safety is 
constraint solving. An automated tool mechanically derives 
verification conditions from the definition of a schema and 
translates them into an input notation of an SMT-LIB 
compliant SMT solver. By the standards of SMT solvers, 
our models are relatively small so a result is reported nearly 
instantaneously.  
One downside of applying constrain solving is the 
absence of any useful feedback to indicate the source of a 
problem should an error be discovered. To compensate for 
this, whenever an SMT solver detects a problem, the tool 
also runs a model checker. Unlike solver that operates on 
derived, a model checker directly explores the state space of 
a discrete transition system that gives semantics to SafeCap 
schemas. It is thus able to report a sequence of step (discrete 
train movements, point switching, route state changes, etc.) 
that leads to a collision or derailment. In most cases, such a 
sequence may be visually replayed to help a user to debug 
the schema. 
Below is an excerpt from the B Method specification of 
two-aspect signalling of the double lead junction scenario. 
MACHINE safety  
SETS  
  POINT;  
  SIGNAL;  
  TRAIN;  
  AMBIT={TBZ1, TBW, TAA, TBV, TCM, TDR, TCL, TCK, TAD, TCN, TAE, TAC, TAB, 
TBX, TBY, TAG, TBZ, TAA1, TAE2, TDQ, TDQ1, TBW1, TBU1};  
  ASPECT={RED,GREEN};  
  LINE={A_F, A_B, D_C, E_C};  
  ROUTE={A_N3, N3_N14, N14_N16, N16_N, N_N19, N19_F, N16_N8, N8_N1, N1_B, 
D_N18, N18_N10, N10_N11, N11_N4, N4_N7, N7_N5, N5_C, E_N12, N12_N6, 
N6_N20, N20_N7}  
...  
PROPERTIES  
    /* @axm4 */ LineAll = {  
  A_F |-> {A_N3, N3_N14, N14_N16, N16_N, N_N19, N19_F } ,  
  A_B |-> {A_N3, N3_N14, N14_N16, N16_N8, N8_N1, N1_B } ,  
  D_C |-> {D_N18, N18_N10, N10_N11, N11_N4, N4_N7, N7_N5, N5_C } ,  
  E_C |-> {E_N12, N12_N6, N6_N20, N20_N7, N7_N5, N5_C }     }  
...  
OPERATIONS  
  move_hd(tt) =  
    PRE   
        /* @grd1 */ tt : dom(hd)  
      & /* @grd2 */ hd(tt) /= RouteLast(hdr(tt))  
    THEN  
         hd := hd <+ {tt |-> RouteNext(hdr(tt))(hd(tt))}     ||  
         occ := occ <+ {RouteNext(hdr(tt))(hd(tt)) |-> tt}  
    END;  
    move_hd_collide(tt) =  
     PRE  
        /* @grd1 */ tt : dom(hd)  
      & /* @grd2 */ hd(tt) /= RouteLast(hdr(tt))  
      & /* @grd3 */ RouteNext(hdr(tt))(hd(tt)) : dom(occ)  
    THEN  
         collision := TRUE  
    END;  
...   
Fig. 3.  The B Model used for model-checking safety properties. 
IV. CAPACITY ASSESSMENT 
Depending upon objectives, the capacity assessment may 
be done as a calculation of a single value according to one 
of predefined formulae or by running a detailed simulation 
of train movements.  We use a range of capacity metrics and 
are actively looking for new ones. 
 Theoretical line capacity. This criterion assesses the 
capability of a line (a path through a junction) to support a 
certain amount of traffic irrespective of signalling 
 
Fig. 2.  Double lead junction scenario. 
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constraints and safety requirements. The following formula 
gives theoretical line capacity in trains per second: 
TC 1( l)= ( ∑
r∈routes ( l)
∑
a∈ ambits( r)
len(a)
sl (a)
)
− 1
 
where len(s) and sl(s) are the length, in meters, and the 
maximum allowed  speed, in meters per second, of ambit a. 
The figure produced by TC(l) is always much higher than 
attainable in practice and is generally not useful even as a 
first approximation. It is sensitive only to track length and 
static speed limits. For the scenario in Fig. 2 we have 
TC1(AB) = 0.014  and TC1(AE) = 0.015 which gives 50 
(AB) and 55 (AE) trains per hour.  
 An alternative calculation considers the kind of traffic 
travelling through a junction and assesses its capability to 
traverse junction lines. It calculates line capacity assuming 
the worst mixture of traffic – interleaving of fastest and 
slowest trains.  
TC 2( l)= (maxi, j min(V imax , V jmax)2 ( 1di − 1d j ))− 1  
where i and j are some two dissimilar train kinds travelling 
over line l; Vimax and Vjmax are the train maximum speeds; di 
and dj are the maximum decelerations of trains i and j. The 
calculation for the double lead junction gives TC2(AB) = 
TC2(AE) = 0.009 that correspond to approximately one train 
every two minutes.  
 Critical section. One obvious weakness of the theoretical 
capacity method is its inability to capture the notion of 
shared or intersecting track and hence the interference of 
traffic on crossing lines that leads to decreased capacity. It is 
thus tempting to localise the source of interference - identify 
the so called critical section of a network -  and try to 
measure  its contribution to capacity loss. One approach is to 
calculate the maximum time a train on a given line occupies 
the critical section. The shorter such time is, the less is the 
interference of a chosen line with other intersecting lines. 
Taking a weighted sum of occupation times of the crossing 
lines gives a figure that might be expected to correlate with 
the capacity lost due to line interference. Weights are 
selected to reflect relative traffic frequency on the lines.  
 The main challenge consists in identifying the location 
and the boundaries of a critical section. Differing critical 
sections would not only give different absolute figures of 
capacity but may also demonstrate different sensitivity to 
alterations in topology and signalling. It also matters 
whether the occupation time may is estimated following the 
crude theoretical capacity approach or is based on a more 
refined technique taking into the account signalling rules, 
point switching and train inertia. 
 For the example in Fig. 2, a sensible choice of critical 
section is the pair of ambits TAD and TAE including points 
P101 and P103. Using the traffic service pattern from 
'Satisfaction of schedule' method below, we can estimate the 
maximum occupation times for lines AB and EC to be 34 
and 22 seconds. Note that nominally faster line AB has a 
higher occupation time. Although an AB train takes the 
normal branches of P101 and P103, it happens that one AB 
train has to accelerate from a complete stop to cover the 
length of the critical section. 
 Wasted track capacity. One could take a differing 
viewpoint and try to assess how efficiently the existing 
signalling makes use of the available track. Assuming a 
certain traffic pattern, one measures the minimum amount of 
free track observed during a the traffic scenario. The 
principle idea is that line interference and inefficient 
signalling tend to increase train headways. Reducing 
interference and improving signalling would often result in 
tighter headways, i.e., more track being occupied by trains. 
This criterion is unbalanced: it sharply favours slower train 
speed that automatically give shorter headways. For the 
same reason, it is sensitive to ambit sizes and the number of 
signalling aspects. At the moment, our tool does not 
measure wasted track capacity. 
 Cumulative travelled distance. With this criterion one 
measures the total distance travelled by all the trains that 
have entered the junction. The measurement is done for a set 
period of time and starts after a certain delay in an attempt 
mitigate the effect of the initial absence of traffic. The 
guiding intuition here is that a more efficient layout and 
signalling favour a balance between higher average speed 
(more distance covered by an individual train) and less 
wasted capacity (more trains concurrently running on a 
schema track).  The cumulative travelled distance is 
computed as follows 
CTD= ∑
i∈ TR
∫
t0
t1
vi (t)dt
 
where t0 – t1 is observation windows, TR is the set of trains 
and vi(t) is speed of train i at time t. Alternatively, one can 
take t0=0 and t1=tmax and consider the overall average speed 
CDT/(t1− t0) . The figure calculated by the expression 
does not have any particular meaning and is used to rank 
differing versions of the same schema. 
 Satisfaction of schedule. If there is a detailed 
specification of a desired traffic pattern through a junction 
then one may take the ability to satisfy the pattern as a 
(binary) measure of capacity. A service pattern defines train 
kinds and the times trains appear at boundary nodes of a 
schema during some extent of time known as pattern 
duration. It is checked whether all the trains detailed by the 
pattern enter and leave the schema within the duration of the 
pattern.  
 The following is a sample definition of service pattern. 
The first part is specification trains and some of their 
characteristics, pertinent to train performance. 
Name Speed, max Acceleration, max Deceleration, max Length 
EC 40 0.5 0.4 240 
FL 22 0.1 0.08 300 
 The second part specifies the pattern duration and the 
times trains appear on the boundary nodes of the lines of a 
schema. 
Duration 15:00 
Line Train Time 
A_B EC 0:00 
A_B EC 2:00 
E_C FL 0:00 
E_C FL 3:00 
 In this pattern, two fast trains (EC) suffer interference 
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from two slow trains (FL).  A simulation shows that the 
scenario show in Fig. 2 does not satisfy the schedule. In fact 
it takes more than 20 minutes for the last train to leave the 
junction.  
 The SafeCap Platform checks a schedule satisfaction by 
running a timed simulation of the hybrid model. A static 
check of the discrete model part would have already ensured 
that the model is safe - a simulation is only used to 
accurately assess the capacity of a schema.  
Fig. 4.  A timed simulation of the double lead junction scenario. 
 
 The plot in Fig. 4 gives a history of train movement along 
the schema (solid lines depict cumulative distance, x-axis is 
time, dotted lines show speed and filled areas near the 
bottom are the current movement authority of a train). It 
shows that the second of EC trains (blue line) is blocked for 
a considerable time. This schema is equipped with two 
aspect signalling. 
V.  CAPACITY IMPROVEMENT 
SafeCap offers two instruments for capacity 
improvement: a library of user-defined patterns 
transforming topology graphs and signalling; and an 
automated search procedure that attempts to find a list of 
changes that lead to a desired capacity improvement. In this 
paper we only discuss the former. 
 Patterns are written in the Epsilon transformation 
language - a specialised notation for writing model to model 
transformations. A pattern is also an executable program: its 
instantiation is automatic.  
Pattern 1. One drastic measure to improve capacity could 
be a change in topology avoiding the intersection of lines 
A_B and E_C. For this, we instantiate in succession two 
patterns: the first one merges points P101 and P103 to create 
a diamond crossing D101-103. The second pattern replaces 
the diamond crossing with a bridge. The bridge carries the 
E_C traffic avoiding any interference with the A_B traffic. 
As a side effect, the previously available connection 
between boundary nodes A and F has now disappeared (see 
Fig. 2).  
As expected, this change does improve the schema 
capacity although different estimation methods report 
differing results (cf. Fig. 4 and Fig. 6). Theoretical measures 
show no change in capacity apart from those accounted for 
by change in track length.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Modified double lead junction scenario. 
 
The critical section method demonstrates a sharp decrease 
in critical section occupation time: it is zero for line EC and 
much lower for AB as all the trains now go through the 
section at a higher speed. 
Fig. 6.  Double lead junction scenario with bridge. 
 
Wasted capacity method reports very slight improvement 
– just under 3%.  Travelled distance method gives a sensible 
32% improvement. We have found this technique to be the 
most stable indicator of capacity increase.  
Pattern 2. This pattern automatically upgrades all 
signalling rules to 4 aspect signalling while route boundaries 
remain unchanged. Somewhat surprisingly, this pattern 
delivers almost as much capacity improvement (according to 
the travelled distance metric) as the first pattern (although 
the bridge with 4 aspect signalling is still much better).  
Fig. 7.  Double lead junction scenario with 4 aspect signalling. 
 
 This little example attempts to illustrate that it is often 
worthwhile to explore different directions of capacity 
improvement and then separately assess their practicality. 
The following table summarises the capacity assessment 
exercise for the two schema changes. 
Method Bridge Signalling upgrade 
Theoretical, 1 -2% 0% 
Theoretical, 2 0% 0% 
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Critical section 230% -170% 
Wasted capacity ? ? 
Travelled distance 32% 24% 
Schedule unsatisfied → satisfied unsatisfied → satisfied 
VI. SAFECAP TOOLSET 
The SafeCap DSL is the central component of our 
modelling framework - the SafeCap Platform [4]. The 
purpose of the Platform is to enable railway engineers to 
analyse complex junctions by experimenting with signalling 
rules, signalling principles, track topology, safety limits 
(e.g., speed limits for points and crossings) while receiving 
an on-line feedback from automated verification and 
analysis tools. The overall motivation in the development of 
the Platform is to offer a range of techniques for assessing 
and improving the ability of layouts and signalling rules to 
efficiently accommodate railway traffic.  
 
Fig. 8.  The Safecap Platform screenshot. 
 
As an implementation platform, we have decided to use 
the Eclipse Integrated Environment and Eclipse Modelling 
framework (EMF) to realise our DSL. One important 
consideration was the ability to benefit from the extensive 
EMF ecosystem which offers a tool-kit for model 
manipulation and the construction of graphical and textual 
editing tools. A screen shot of the running platform is given 
in Fig. 8. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This work is conducted as part of a SafeCap research 
project (safecap.cs.ncl.ac.uk, 2011-2013) sponsored by 
RSSB and EPSRC UK. The partners of the project are 
Newcastle University (UK) - Coordinator, Swansea 
University (UK), Invensys Rail and AIST (Japan). The 
overall aim of the project is to develop modelling techniques 
and tools for improving railway capacity and ensuring safety 
standards. To achieve this aim the project team is working 
on developing proof-based reasoning about time in state-
based models, providing an open tool support for verifying 
timed systems, developing an intuitive graphical domain-
specific language for the railway domain with a tailored tool 
support and on identifying and validating design patterns for 
improving railway capacity by altering route design, track 
layout, signalling principles and driving rules. 
One decision we have made early in the project was to 
develop a railway domain specific language (DSL) to allow 
the engineers to operate in terms of their domain and to hide 
the formal verification from them as much as possible. The 
definition of this DSL is in the core of our method. We have 
developed a compact and, in our opinion, simple domain 
language for describing railway topologies and signalling 
rules. The language is strictly defined making it possible to 
benefit from widely available verification tools. In the scope 
of this paper we were not able to discuss train movement 
rules that constitute an important part of the domain 
language semantics.  
Our plans are to further develop the Platform, the 
SafeCap DSL and the methods of analysing and improving 
capacity. Route-based signalling discussed in this paper is 
only one the several semantics that we plan to support in the 
Platform. An interesting challenge, from the viewpoint of 
capacity assessment, is modelling the dynamic definition of 
ambit boundaries that adapt to train progress and speed.  
The railway domain has always been one of the areas in 
which formal methods are successfully deployed and used in 
a substantial way. For example, in France RATP (a major 
rail operator) with a considerable experience in formal 
methods, looks favourably on using formal methods to 
conform to the development standards that they require. 
From the mid 90s, in France, RATP, the main rail operator 
with considerable experience of formal methods, has been 
approving various developments that use the B method as 
meeting the development standards RATP require [2]. There 
are now several tool development companies supporting the 
use of the B [6] and Event-B [3] methods in the railway 
domain: ClearSy, Systerel, and Formal Mind. In addition to 
the B method model-checking has been successfully used by 
various railway companies working together with 
universities (see, for example, [7,8]). 
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